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13.1  Introduction 
The primary objective of this study is to develop improved estimates 
of pension wealth. This will help determine how large pension wealth 
is relative to other components of wealth  and how consideration  of 
pension wealth affects measures of the distribution of income and wealth. 
Data limitations have prevented a comprehensive investigation of pen- 
sion wealth  relative to other components of household  wealth.  The 
1983  Survey of  Consumer Finance (SCF) provides a unique opportu- 
nity to examine this issue because it contains detailed information on 
household finances and both nonpension wealth, obtained from house- 
hold  interviews,  and pension  wealth, which can be calculated  from 
pension plan parameters obtained from employers. 
We  present two sets of estimates reflecting different models of the 
pension contract. Under the implicit contract model of Ippolito (1983, 
mean  pension  wealth  is  approximately  $100,000, which  represents 
42.7 percent of mean net worth of households with pension coverage. 
Under the explicit contract model of  Bulow (1982), the estimates of 
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pension  wealth  are much  lower; however,  mean  pension  wealth  is 
still approximately $50,000. When pension wealth is incorporated into 
estimates of the distribution  of total  wealth,  measured inequality is 
reduced. 
The next  section  of the paper defines  pension  wealth  for defined 
contribution and defined benefit plans, the latter valued by both the 
legal and the projected earnings methods. Section 13.3 defines pension 
saving. Section 13.4 asks which method should be chosen to measure 
pension wealth. Section 13.5 reports estimates of pension wealth and 
saving from the SCF. Section 13.6  examines  the relations among  wealth, 
pension wealth, and age. Section 13.7 looks at the effect of including 
pension  wealth in  the distribution of wealth.  Section 13.8 compares 
these results with those of other studies and draws some conclusions. 
13.2  What Is Pension Wealth? 
A worker covered by a defined benefit pension plan exchanges labor 
services for current earnings and the promise of future income in the 
form of pension benefits. The value of future pension benefits depends 
on the nature of the labor contract, survival probabilities, market in- 
terest rates, and government regulations. Two methods of calculating 
pension wealth have been proposed. These are the legal method de- 
veloped by Bulow (1982) and the projected earnings method outlined 
in  Ippolito (1985). This section defines pension wealth and examines 
the life-cycle pattern of pension wealth implied by pension coverage 
when wealth is calculated using these methods. The final part of this 
section describes pension wealth for workers covered by defined con- 
tribution plans, under which there is less ambiguity about the nature 
of the pension contract. 
13.2.1  Legal Method of  Calculating Pension Wealth: 
Defined Benefit Plans 
Under the legal method of determining pension wealth, the employ- 
ment contract is assumed to be valid for a single period. Of  course, 
the contract may be  renewed, but  the worker acts as if  he will  be 
terminated at the end of each period. Therefore, he is willing to pay 
for only those pension benefits that the firm is legally required to pay 
if  the worker leaves the firm at the end of the current period. 
For any specific worker, pension wealth is calculated by finding the 
annual benefit that a worker would receive if  he left the firm today. 
This benefit depends on the plan benefit formula, the extent to which 
the worker is vested in  the plan, and, for most plans, the worker’s 
current years of service and earnings history. Despite leaving the firm, 
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in the  plan  actually  to receive  any  benefits.  Once  started, benefits 
usually continue for the remainder of the worker’s life. Thus, the wealth 
value of these benefits is found by determining the expected discounted 
value of a life annuity beginning at the retirement age. Pension wealth 
is illiquid in the sense that it cannot be sold in  total or in  part, but 
individuals may be able to borrow against this asset. 
Even in this strict legal interpretation of the pension contract, there 
is some uncertainty as to whether the worker will receive the full value 
of  his  pension  wealth.  The worker  could  die prior  to reaching  the 
retirement age and receive no pension benefits. If the worker is married, 
the surviving spouse may be eligible for survivorship benefits based 
on the vested benefits of the worker. The firm could terminate the plan 
due to financial difficulties. The federally established insurance system, 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,  does not fully guarantee 
vested benefits, Finally, the real value of these future benefits depends 
on the rate of inflation and any postretirement increases in  benefits. 
Despite these risks associated with the determination of legal pension 
wealth, we believe that pension wealth calculated in this manner should 
be a useful, approximate lower-bound estimate of true pension wealth. 
Coverage by a pension plan produces a predictable pattern of pension 
wealth accumulation over the life of an individual. The magnitude of 
pension wealth depends on plan generosity and worker characteristics 
and, therefore, will vary across workers. Using the legal method, pen- 
sion wealth is very low during the early working years because workers 
have lower earnings and little credited service and must  wait many 
years to receive benefits. However, pension wealth rises rapidly as long 
as the worker remains with the firm. The growth in pension wealth is 
due to increased years of  service, higher earnings, and a reduction in 
the number of years until retirement. Each of these factors accelerates 
the growth rate of pension wealth over time, and, as a result, the rate 
of growth of  pension wealth will exceed the rate of growth of earnings 
as job tenure increases. This continues until the worker reaches the 
age of eligibility for retirement benefits. 
If the worker remains on the job past the normal retirement age, his 
pension wealth in most plans will decline with continued work, and 
the  rate  of  decline  will  accelerate  with  advancing age  (Clark  and 
McDermed 1986; Kotlikoff and Wise 1985). This results from the fact 
that most firms do not provide an actuarial increase in benefits with 
postponed retirement. In addition, approximately half of all pension 
participants are in plans that cease to credit wage and service accruals 
after the normal retirement age. Thus, the annual benefit may be frozen 
at the normal retirement age, and, with continued employment, the 
worker will have fewer years to receive benefits producing the decline 
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We  have constructed a simulation model to illustrate this life-cycle 
pattern of wealth accumulation for a worker covered by a pension plan. 
The worker is assumed to have been hired at age twenty-five with total 
compensation equaling $20,000. Total compensation, which is divided 
into earnings and pension compensation, grows at a rate of 5.5 percent 
per year. This is based on an assumed real rate of growth of 1.5 percent 
per year and an inflation of 4 percent per year. Pension compensation, 
the growth in pension wealth associated with the employment contract, 
is  the change in pension  wealth  with  additional  service and  higher 
earnings. It does not include the change in pension wealth associated 
with aging that is independent of the employment contract. 
The normal retirement age is sixty-five, and the plan offers no early 
retirement benefits.  There are no postretirement adjustments in ben- 
efits, and the plan has immediate and full vesting. The plan continues 
to credit fully increases in earnings and service as long as the worker 
remains with the firm. The benefit is determined by multiplying 0.015 
times years of service times average earnings in the last five years. The 
market  interest rate is 6 percent, and workers are assumed to face 
mortality probabilities as shown in the 1981 U.S. Life Table for white 
men (US.  Department of Commerce 1984). 
The results of the simulations are shown in table 13.1. Starting with 
zero pension wealth at  age twenty-five, the worker’s wealth rises slowly 
at first and reaches $13,945 at age forty. At this age, pension wealth 
represents about one-third  of annual earnings.  Between the ages of 
forty and sixty-five, pension wealth grows by over 100 percent per five 
years of  work. The rate of growth of pension wealth declines slightly 
with  age  during  this time.  At  age  sixty-five,  pension  wealth  totals 
$613,518, or 3.7  times  annual  earnings.  Deflating this value  to age 
twenty-five dollars indicates a real pension wealth at age sixty-five of 
$128,000. In this example, increases in earnings and service continue 
to raise pension wealth after age sixty-five but at a rate slower than 
prior to the worker reaching the age of eligibility for full pension benefits. 
Several additional points need to be emphasized concerning the life- 
cycle pattern of pension wealth. First, a vested worker leaving a firm 
does not  lose any of  his accumulated pension  wealth.  However, if 
earnings do not rise with the job change, the worker will accumulate 
less additional pension wealth with the new employer than if he had 
remained on his initial job. Even if  the worker has the same earnings 
and both employers have the same pension plan, wealth accumulation 
will  be slower for the job changer because years of  service at the 
previous job will not be credited in the pension at the new job. Second, 
after the worker retires, pension wealth falls systematically with ad- 
vancing age due to  declines in life expectancy. Unanticipated increases 
in the rate of  inflation will also lower the pension wealth of retirees. Table 13.1  Employee Compensation and Pension Wealth: Legal Method 
Pension 
Compensation as 
Tenure  Earnings  Pension  Percentage of Total  Pension  Pension  Pension 
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Source; Data are based on a simulation of compensation for a male worker who remains with a firm throughout his work 
life.  He is assumed to have been hired at age 25 with total annual compensation (earnings plus  pension compensation) 
equal to $20,000. Total compensation grows at 5.5  percent per year. The worker is covered by a pension with a normal 
retirement age of  65 and a benefit formula of  ,015 times average earnings in last five years times years of  service. The 
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13.2.2  Projected Earnings Method of Determining Pension Wealth: 
Defined Benefit Plans 
An alternative  method of calculating pension  wealth assumes that 
the worker and the firm enter into a long-term, implicit contract. The 
worker promises to remain with the firm until retirement and to perform 
at the agreed level of effort. The firm promises to continue to employ 
the worker as long as he fulfills the terms of  the contract. To enforce 
the contract, a firm requires that workers pay for a pension value that 
is conditional on their remaining with the firm. The “stay pension” 
exceeds the pension to which workers are legally entitled, which we 
will call the “leave  pension.”  Firm reputation in the labor market is 
assumed to be sufficient to keep the firm from reneging on its obligations. 
In this model of the labor contract, workers are paid total compen- 
sation equal to their value of marginal product in each period. Com- 
pensation consists of earnings and pension compensation. The difference 
between this model and the legal method is that pension compensation 
is based on pension wealth that is conditional on the worker remaining 
with the firm until retirement. In each period, pension wealth is based 
on the plan benefit formula, current years of service, and projected 
earnings in the final working years just prior to retirement. 
Since projected  future earnings  are typically greater than  current 
earnings, the “stay pension” wealth based on projected earnings will 
exceed the “leave pension”  wealth, which is the value derived using 
the legal method. Under an implicit contract, workers pay for the stay 
pension, but, if  they quit their jobs or are laid off, they receive only 
the leave pension. This difference represents a capital loss in pension 
wealth associated with termination of employment. Thus, pension wealth 
based on the projected earnings method entails an additional form of 
risk for the worker, that is, the risk of job termination. This estimate 
of pension wealth should be an upper-bound estimate of the worker’s 
true pension wealth. 
Pension wealth based on the projected earnings method of calculation 
also follows  a predictable  life-cycle pattern. As long as the worker 
remains with a single firm, wealth rises until the age of  eligibility for 
benefits. Compared to pension wealth based on the legal method, wealth 
is higher early in the work life because it is based on projected  final 
earnings rather than actual earnings but  rises more slowly with job 
tenure because projected final earnings do not change over time. Pen- 
sion compensation drops sharply at the normal retirement age and may 
become negative if the worker remains with the firm. The decline after 
the normal retirement  age is due to the ending of the implicit,  long- 
term contract. The worker may remain with the firm after this date but 
is assumed to be covered by an explicit, year-by-year contract. This 695  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
results in benefits and pension compensation based on the legal method 
and actual earnings received after the termination of the implicit contract. 
If  the worker leaves a job, his pension wealth drops sharply from 
the stay pension to the leave pension.  The magnitude of this capital 
loss rises during the initial working years, peaks in the late forties or 
early fifties, and then  declines.  Of course, at the normal  retirement 
age, there is no loss from leaving because the worker has completed 
the terms of the contract. 
A simulation example can be used to illustrate the life-cycle pattern 
of wealth accumulation using the projected earnings method. Using the 
same pension and worker characteristics as described above, pension 
wealth at various ages is  shown in table  13.2. After completing one 
year of work, pension wealth is $2,822. This value rises with additional 
years of work, and the rate of increase rises slightly with job tenure. 
Pension wealth is more than one year of earnings by age forty, when 
wealth is $51,752. Pension wealth grows by about 70 percent per five 
years of employment, growing to $690,677 at age sixty-five. Even though 
the two simulations assume that the worker has the same total com- 
pensation in each year, pension wealth at age sixty-five differs slightly. 
This result is from the small difference in annual earnings between the 
ages of sixty and sixty-four. Annual earnings are endogenously deter- 
mined by the algorithm and differ throughout the work life. 
Also shown in table  13.2 is the capital loss associated with leaving 
the job. This loss in pension wealth rises from $21,346 at age thirty- 
five to $105,082 at age fifty-five. The loss in pension wealth associated 
with job termination  declines  to zero at age  sixty-five.  A  series of 
simulations illustrating the potential capital loss over the work life for 
various industry, occupation, and plan size groups are shown in Allen, 
Clark, and McDermed (1986). 
13.2.3 
Pension wealth for workers covered by a defined contribution plan 
is equal to the value of the funds in their accounts. Each pay period, 
a firm using a defined contribution plan contributes a specified sum into 
a pension  account for its workers. Employer contributions may  be 
augmented by contributions by the employee. The funds are invested 
and  increase over time  with  additional  contributions and  the com- 
pounding of rate of return on the funds. Future benefits are determined 
entirely by the magnitude of the pension fund at retirement. The firm’s 
liability ends each period with the contribution. Thus, pension wealth 
at each age is equal to the value of the pension fund. Calculation of 
current pension wealth does not require any projection of future earn- 
ings or rates of inflation. This value is not affected by potential job 
Pension Wealth in Defined Contribution Plans Table 13.2  Employee Compensation and Pension Wealth: Projected Earnings Method 
Pension 
Compensation as 
Tenure  Earnings  Pension  Percentage of Total  Pension  Pension  Capital 
Age  (years)  6)  Compensation ($)  Compensation  Benefit ($)  Wealth ($)  Loss ($) 
25  0 
30  5 
35  10 
40  15 
45  20 
50  25 
55  30 
60  35 
64  39 
65  40 
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Source: Data are based on a simulation of  compensation for a male worker who remains with  a firm throughout his 
work life. He is assumed to have been hired at age 25 with total annual compensation (earnings  plus pension compensation) 
equal to $20,000. Total compensation grows at 5.5 percent per year. The worker is covered by a pension with a normal 
retirement age of 65 and a benefit of  .015 times average earnings in last five years times years of  service. The market 
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changes. As  such, the  wealth  of  the  worker is not  subject to risks 
concerning job change, but the worker does bear all rate of return risks. 
13.3  What Is Pension Saving? 
Pension saving is the change in pension wealth from one year to the 
next. It includes pension compensation as well as the change in pension 
wealth resulting from aging. The two methods of calculating pension 
wealth predict somewhat different patterns of savings. Using the legal 
method, the dollar value of pension saving rises rapidly with increased 
job tenure. In addition, prior to the normal retirement age, the ratio of 
pension saving to total compensation also rises rapidly. Table 13.1 shows 
that, in our simulation example, pension savings rise from $1,045 at 
age thirty-five to $81,030 at age sixty-five. Using the projected earnings 
method, the dollar value of pension  saving and the ratio of  pension 
saving to total compensation increase with job tenure but at a slower 
rate than that implied by the legal method. For example, pension saving 
at age thirty-five is $3,435 and rises to $67,183 at age sixty-five (results 
are not shown in table 13.2). 
13.4  Which Method Should Be Used to Measure Pension Wealth? 
Both the legal and the projected earnings methods have been pro- 
posed as the appropriate procedure for estimating pension wealth. Which 
method best captures the nature of the pension contract? Because they 
yield different predictions concerning labor market behavior, the com- 
peting hypotheses can be tested. Primarily, these different predictions 
concern the rate of growth of earnings and the propensity of workers 
covered by pensions to quit. The predictions of the projected earnings 
method seem to conform to the reality of observed labor market influ- 
ences of pensions. 
Under the projected earnings method, workers stand to lose pension 
wealth if  they leave their current employers, which is consistent with 
the lower quit rates observed for workers covered by pensions (Mitchell 
1982; Allen,  Clark, and  McDermed  1986; Ippolito  1987). The legal 
method predicts that the growth rate of earnings for workers covered 
by pensions should be lower than that for other workers, whereas the 
projected earnings method predicts that pension coverage has no effect 
on the growth  of  earnings. The evidence (Ippolito  1985; Clark and 
McDermed 1988) is consistent with the latter interpretation. Another 
implication of the legal method is that there should be large decreases 
in earnings when workers become vested or become eligible for early 
retirement (Kotlikoff and Wise  1985). There is no evidence of  such 698  A. A. McDenned/R. L. ClarMS. G. Allen 
earnings behavior. In addition, many firms provide ad hoc postretire- 
ment benefit increases that can be justified only in terms of an implicit 
labor contract (Allen, Clark, and Sumner 1986). 
Despite this tentative conclusion that the available evidence tends 
to support the implicit contracting theory of pension, we have calcu- 
iated pension wealth using both the methods described in  this paper. 
The legal method provides an approximate lower-bound estimate of 
pension wealth, and the projected earnings method provides an upper 
bound. By comparing the range of  these estimates, we should have a 
reasonable estimate of the true magnitude of pension wealth. 
13.5  Household Wealth and the SCF 
The 1983 SCF is the latest in a series of surveys sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to measure the wealth holdings of house- 
holds in  the United States. The survey contains comprehensive data 
on the assets and liabilities of a representative sample of U.S. house- 
holds. Additional personal and employment characteristics are included 
in  the survey (Avery, Elliehausen, and Canner 1984a, 1984b). These 
data are sufficient to construct employment histories for most respon- 
dents and their spouses. The actual data tape used in this study is an 
early copy provided by the FRB. In addition to the household responses 
to the SCF, this tape also contains a series of variables constructed by 
the researchers  at the FRB.  Our analysis relies on their estimate of 
nonpension net wealth as well as their imputations  for missing responses. 
The SCF consists of two samples: a representative cross-sectional 
sample consisting of 3,665 usable households and a special high-income 
sample containing 438  households.  In  this  paper, we  report  results 
based on the combined samples and employ weights provided by the 
FRB that convert the combined sample to a representation of the U.S. 
household population as measured by the 1980 census. 
The 1983 SCF sought to gather sufficient data to allow analysts to 
construct the first accurate measures of  pension wealth. To this end, 
there are numerous questions on the survey pertaining to the type and 
level of pension benefits. Respondents were asked whether they were 
covered by a pension and, if  so, whether it was a defined benefit or 
defined contribution plan. They were asked the expected future value 
of benefits from a defined benefit plan and the date when they expected 
to begin  receiving them.  For defined contribution plans,  they  were 
asked the current value of  their accounts. Respondents were  asked 
about other types of  thrift and profit-sharing plans. They were also 
asked about any pensions on past jobs from which they expected to 
receive a benefit. People currently receiving pension benefits were asked 
the annual value of their benefits. From these questions alone, a mea- 699  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
sure of pension wealth can be constructed. This approach has been 
used to estimate pension wealth from the Retirement  History Study 
by Quinn (1985) and from the President’s Commission on Pension Pol- 
icy by Cartwright and Friedland (1985). 
The distinctive feature of  the SCF, however, is that data were also 
gathered from the pension plan sponsor concerning the plan charac- 
teristics. These data were separately coded onto a pension-provider 
tape, which we received from the Survey Research Center of the Uni- 
versity of  Michigan in conjunction with a Department of Labor con- 
tract. These data consist of detailed plan characteristics on the normal 
benefit formulas and how they apply to various types of workers. For- 
mulas for deferred vested participants, maximum benefits, and social 
security offsets were also included. 
To  determine  the  value  of  pension  benefits  on  respondents’  and 
spouses’ present jobs, we used these specific benefit formulas in con- 
junction  with required  respondent characteristics.  The methodology 
used  to calculate pension  benefits and pension  wealth  is described 
below. This methodology is used only for persons covered by a defined 
benefit plan on their current  jobs. The treatment of defined contribution 
plans on current jobs and the value of benefits on past jobs is described 
in a separate section. 
13.5.1  Calculation of Pensions Benefits from Defined Benefit Plans 
on Current Jobs 
The calculation of pension benefits for defined benefit plans from the 
pension-provider data required that the benefit formulas as coded in 
the data be converted  to computational algorithms.  Most plans had 
several normal retirement and deferred vesting formulas that applied 
to different types of  workers or applied to different periods of  em- 
ployment.  These formulas were  often  linear  combinations  and  fre- 
quently  required  one  to  assess  relative  values  from  alternative 
combinations of formulas. Eight of  the plans had formulas that were 
integrated with formulas from other plans. These plans were eliminated 
from the analysis. 
The next step was to apply the algorithms to particular individuals. 
Work  and salary histories were constructed from the household data. 
The value of years of  service used in the algorithms was determined 
from current job tenure as reported by respondents.  Salary histories 
and earnings projections were based on two alternative assumptions 
about real earnings growth: a constant 5.5 percent annual growth rate, 
reflecting 1.5 percent economy-wide real wage growth and 4 percent 
inflation (CGE), and the FRB estimate of expected annual occupation- 
specific real wage growth controlled for industry, age, race, and sex 
(FGE). The FRB estimate also assumes that earnings grow 5.5 percent 700  A. A. McDermed/R. L. ClarWS. G.  Allen 
per year in addition to the occupation-specific component. Specifically, 
each person  was assigned age-related earnings growth rates for ages 
younger than thirty-five, thirty-five to fifty-four, and fifty-five and over. 
These rates vary across the sample by race, sex, industry, and occu- 
pation. FRB estimates of these occupation-specific rates were not avail- 
able for the high-income sample. 
Legal pension wealth based on an explicit labor contract is calculated 
from benefits the worker would receive if the worker left the firm today. 
Workers who are vested and leave a job are legally entitled to receive 
a benefit based on the deferred vested benefit formulas rather than on 
the normal benefit formulas. Thus, all benefits using the legal method 
of determining pension wealth are based on the deferred vested benefit 
data and assume that the person begins benefits at the worker’s ex- 
pected  retirement  age. Vesting  status was  determined from  worker 
characteristics provided  in the respondent data and vesting require- 
ments  reported  in  the pension-provider data.  For  salary-based for- 
mulas, earnings histories of the appropriate length were constructed 
for each of the assumptions described above. Service years were cur- 
rent job tenure in  1983. Workers who were not currently vested were 
assumed to have zero legal pension wealth. 
For the projected earnings method, workers were assumed to remain 
with their current employers until their expected retirement ages as 
given in the respondent interviews. Therefore, projected earnings wealth 
was based on the normal retirement formulas provided by the firm. If 
the worker was not eligible for normal benefits at the reported retire- 
ment  age, the worker  was  assumed to retire at  the  earliest age of 
eligibility for normal benefits. Benefits in this method were based on 
earnings projected to retirement and current years of service. Projected 
earnings wealth  was  calculated under  each of  the two assumptions 
about earnings growth. 
Each plan was checked to see if  it had a maximum benefit formula 
or was  integrated  with  social  security. If  the plan  had  a  maximum 
benefit, then the benefit as calculated was restricted to this maximum. 
Social security integration is done either by excess formulas that pay 
a higher fraction of earnings above the social security wage base than 
for earnings below it or by reducing the pension benefit by some fraction 
of the social security benefit. 
For the excess method, we projected the social security maximum 
taxable earnings to grow at 5.5 percent per year (this is the assumption 
used in the intermediate projections of  the Social Security Adminis- 
tration). We  then calculated the average wage base that firms can legally 
use in conjunction with the excess method. The plan formula indicates 
whether this level or some other level will be used. We  assumed that 
the excess formula will not be revised during the respondent’s work 
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The offset plans required us to calculate the social security benefit 
that the worker expects to receive at retirement. Social security re- 
ductions were based  on projected social security benefits at the ex- 
pected  retirement age. We  assumed that the current social security 
offsets in the pension benefit formulas would apply when the worker 
retired.  Using the two growth assumptions, earnings were projected 
to rise from their current level until retirement. This work history was 
then used to calculate the worker’s social security primary insurance 
amount (PIA). 
We  assumed that the social security benefit formula would not be 
revised but that, as in  1983, the bend points of the formula would rise 
with the rate of growth of taxable earnings. Earnings prior to age sixty 
were indexed by the maximum taxable earnings at age sixty-two, while 
earnings after age sixty-two were indexed  by the rate  of growth of 
prices. The social security benefit calculated by this method was then 
introduced into the benefit formula. In most plans, the offset is some 
fraction of the social security benefit that varies with earnings or years 
of service subject to a maximum offset. In this analysis, we have ignored 
the future changes in social security that were adopted in  1983. 
13.5.2  Calculation of Pension Benefits for Defined Contribution 
Plans and for Past Jobs 
In defined contribution plans, the firm and/or the employee contribute 
a specified amount each pay period into an employee account. Benefits 
at retirement are based on the amount of funds in the account. At any 
point in time, pension wealth is the value of the employee’s account. 
While there are data on the pension-provider tape for defined contri- 
bution plans, this information is less useful in determining future pen- 
sion benefits. We  could have used these data along with assumptions 
concerning past contribution rates, rates of  growth of  earnings, and 
rates of return to the pension fund to estimate the current value of the 
pension account. 
Instead, we relied on answers to questions on the respondent tape 
concerning the current value of the pension account. It is likely that 
most of the people covered by defined contribution plans receive some 
type of annual statement concerning the current value of their pension 
accounts. The estimate of this form of  pension wealth requires only 
this knowledge; it specifically does not require the respondent to fore- 
cast future rates of growth in wages and prices; nor does it necessitate 
any evaluation of the prospects of leaving the firm. Therefore, we take 
the respondent’s own evaluation of current pension wealth as the best 
estimate of  its true value. All missing values concerning the funds in 
the defined contribution accounts were imputed by researchers at the 
FRB. Since we are interested in pension wealth, we did not convert 
the value of the pension account into any implied future benefit. 702  A. A. McDermed/R. L. ClarWS. G.  Allen 
Many respondents and their spouses expect to receive benefits from 
pensions  on previous jobs. For the most part, the pension-provider 
tape does not contain information on the plan characteristics of  pen- 
sions on past jobs. However, individuals were asked about the pension 
benefits they expected to receive from past jobs. We  assumed that the 
respondents gave the value of benefits that they expected to receive at 
retirement. For past jobs, this may be a reasonably accurate estimate. 
Having already left the job, the nominal benefit at retirement will not 
be affected by  any further work; nor will  it be influenced by future 
earnings or inflation. Departing workers may also have been told the 
benefit to expect in their exit interviews with the firm. If  respondents 
answered that they were covered by a pension on their current jobs 
but did not know either coverage or expected benefits from past jobs, 
we assigned them their pension wealth from their current job alone. 
13.5.3 
Some respondents  reported that either they or their spouse were 
covered by a pension on their current jobs, but there are no data for 
these plans on the pension-provider tape. For these workers, we im- 
puted  the value of  their pension benefit. A  pension  benefit equation 
was estimated for persons covered by  a pension on their present job 
and for whom we had calculated a benefit using the procedure described 
above. The results from four regression equations are shown in table 
13.3. The equations are for two benefits using the legal method and 
Missing Values for Pension Benefits 
Table 13.3  Pension Benefit Equations for Persons Currently Working and 
Covered by a Defined Benefit Plan 
Legal  Projected 
Variable  CGEa  FGEb  CGEc  FGEd 














-  1.13*** 
i.41) 
Manufacturing  -  .45 
(.33) 
-  .63 
(.41) 




-  .49 
(.36) 
-  .58 
(.45) 




Wholesale and retail 
trade 
-  1.04*** 
(.41) 
-  .90* 
~50) 




-  1.57*** 
i.42) 
-  1.48*** 
(.m 
-  .52 
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Table 13.3  (continued) 
Variable 
Legal  Projected 
CGE”  FGEb  CGEc  FGEd 














-  .52 
(.60) 








-  .33* 
(. 19) 








-  .79 
(.76) 




-  .67*** 
(.23) 
-  .39* 
(.22) 
-  .33 
(.23) 








Source:  Benefit data are from the pension-provider portion of the SCF for all persons 
covered by a defined benefit plan on their current  job. Other variables for each individual 
are from the household portion of the SCF. 
Nore: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of  pension benefit  as calculated by 
each of two methods using one of two earnings growth assumptions. The omitted in- 
dustrial group is  agriculture, forestry, fishing,  and mining.  The omitted occupational 
group is professional, technical, and kindred workers. Standard errors  are in parentheses. 
=Pension benefit  is calculated using the legal method assuming a constant 5.5 percent 
growth in annual earnings. 
bPension benefit  is calculated using  the legal method assuming the individual specific 
growth rate in earnings derived by the FRB. 
CPension benefit is calculated using the projected earnings method assuming a constant 
5.5 percent growth in annual earnings. 
“Pension  benefit is calculated using the projected earnings method assuming the individual 
specific growth rate in earnings derived by the FRB. 
*Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level 
**Coefficient  is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level 
***Coefficient is statistically significant at the  1 percent confidence level. 704  A. A. McDermed/R.  L. ClarWS. G.  Allen 
two benefits using the projected earnings method. The benefits for each 
method are based on our two assumptions concerning the rate of growth 
of earnings. The FGE benefit equations are estimated using respondents 
only from the cross-sectional sample since salary projections were not 
made by the FRB for the high-income sample. 
These benefit  equations are interesting in  their  own right. To  our 
knowledge, they are the first estimates of pension benefits based on a 
large sample of data combining actual worker and plan characteristics. 
Explanatory variables include a series of industry and occupational 
dichotomous variables along with age, job tenure, and salary. The rel- 
atively few statistically significant differences among the industry and 
occupational coefficients is somewhat surprising; however, it  should 
be remembered that we controlled for salary and tenure differences. 
When benefits are estimated using a constant 5.5 percent per year 
growth in earnings (CGE), the elasticity of benefits with respect to job 
tenure is slightly less  than one, while the elasticity  of  benefits with 
respect to salary is slightly greater than one. These values hold for 
both the legal and the projected methods of calculating benefits. The 
relative values of these two elasticities is reversed in the equations that 
are based on the FRB earnings growth assumptions; however, all eight 
of  the estimates for these two variables are relatively close to one. 
Only the parameter estimate for salary in the legal CGE equation and 
the parameter estimate for tenure in the projected earnings CGE equa- 
tion are statistically significantly different from one at the .05 level of 
significance. 
If  the benefit formula were a simple multiplicative, earnings-based 
formula, then both the tenure and the salary elasticities should be one. 
The existence of social security offsets tends to make benefits rise by 
more than a proportional percentage in response to salary increases, 
while maximum benefits would tend to make the tenure  and  salary 
elasticities less than one. The negative age elasticities in the equations 
for projected benefits follow from the construction of the benefit. Hold- 
ing salary and tenure constant, the projected benefit will be lower for 
older workers as long as the growth rate of earnings is positive. 
Benefits from defined benefit pensions on the current job for persons 
with missing values were imputed from these regression equations and 
the individual and firm characteristics. Persons with missing data con- 
cerning the value of benefits from past jobs are given the mean value 
of this type of pension benefit for similar types of workers. 
13.5.4  Summary of Pension Benefit Data 
There are 2,304 households in  the  sample who are covered  by  a 
pension on a current or past job. This represents 56.2 percent of  the 
unweighted households and 54.8 percent of the weighted households. 705  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
Of  these households, 1,592 have at least one family member who is a 
participant in a defined benefit plan on his current job. We  were able 
to derive pension benefits using the plan-specific data for 889 of these 
households.  Therefore, we  imputed  pension  benefits for 703  house- 
holds. Pension-provider data were not available for these households 
because the interviewers were unable to locate the firm, there were no 
summary plan descriptions available, or for some other reason the firm 
interview was not completed. 
Pension wealth from defined contribution plans was determined for 
236 households, and pension wealth from past jobs was derived for 740 
households. A household could, of course, have wealth from one or 
more of these sources. Persons with thrift plans or profit-sharing plans 
are not included in these counts; however, the value in these accounts 
as given by the respondents is included in pension wealth. 
13.5.5  Calculation of Pension Wealth 
For defined benefit plans,  we converted the value of the pension 
benefit into a wealth value calculating the value of  a life annuity be- 
ginning at the age of expected retirement as indicated by the respon- 
dent. Benefits were assumed to remain fixed in nominal terms, and the 
interest (or discount) rate was set at 6 percent. The 1981 mortality rates 
by race and sex were used to determine survival probabilities. Pensions 
were assumed to have no death benefits. As noted above, respondents 
with defined contribution plans were assumed to have accurately re- 
ported their pension wealth. Pension wealth is the sum of all defined 
contribution and defined benefit values from current and past jobs as 
well as withdrawable amounts in thrift-type accounts. 
13.5.6  Calculation of Pension Savings 
Pension savings is calculated only for persons  who are currently 
working on a job and are participating in a defined benefit pension plan. 
For these workers, pension savings was calculated by estimating cur- 
rent pension wealth as described above and subtracting this value from 
pension wealth one year later. Pension wealth in the succeeding year 
was calculated by increasing job tenure by one year and increasing the 
salary average based  on the two estimates of earnings growth. This 
method combines the gain in wealth attributable to an additional year 
of work (pension compensation) and the gain in wealth due to surviving 
an extra year and being closer to retirement age. We  have not calculated 
similar values for persons covered by defined contribution plans. For 
these workers, savings equal new contributions and the return to the 
pension fund. Neither  have we  calculated  savings for persons  with 
pensions on past jobs. Savings from a pension on a past job is solely 706  A. A. McDermed/R. L. ClarWS. G. Allen 
attributable to surviving an extra year and being closer to the retirement 
age. 
13.6  Wealth, Pension Wealth, and Age 
Since the early development of life-cycle saving theory, economists 
have predicted  that household  wealth  will tend  to be relatively low 
early in life, rise during the middle years, and then decline during the 
final years of life. Evidence on the life-cycle accumulation of wealth 
has typically  been from cross-sectional  data and has focused exclu- 
sively on nonpension  wealth.  In this section, we present a compre- 
hensive assessment of pension wealth along with nonpension wealth 
using data from the 1983 SCF. It is important to remember that these 
data represent wealth at a particular point in time for different cohorts 
of households and are not a true measure of  the effect of aging for a 
single cohort. 
13.6.  I  Nonpension Wealth 
Our measure of nonpension wealth is a variable that was created by 
researchers at the FRB. It represents the net value of all paper and 
other financial assets, equity in the respondent’s home and other prop- 
erty, the net value of vehicles and boats, and net worth of any busi- 
nesses or farms. This measure is compiled by examining the response 
to numerous questions concerning family assets and liabilities and is 
intended to represent the standard concept of net household wealth. 
Estimates of nonpension net wealth are shown in table  13.4 for all 
households in the SCF along with  separate estimates for households 
with pension wealth and those without pension wealth.  For all three 
Table 13.4  Mean Nonpension Wealth by Age and Pension Status (dollars) 
All  Households  Households 
Households  with Pensions  without Pensions 






Older than 74 
All households 





























Source: Weighted household wealth data from the SCF. 707  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
samples, mean nonpension wealth is less than $10,300 for households 
with respondents under the age of twenty-five. It rises to $30,000 and 
above for households aged twenty-five to thirty-four. Nonpension wealth 
then more than doubles across each of the next two ten-year age groups. 
This form of wealth continues to increase slightly across the next two 
groups before declining sharply for the oldest age group. For all age 
groups except those aged forty-five to fifty-four, these estimates are 
between fifty and seventy-eight percent higher than estimates of  net 
worth presented by Avery,  Elliehausen, and Canner (1984b), which 
estimates excluded the value of consumer durables such as  automobiles 
and home furnishings, the cash value of life insurance, and equity in 
small businesses and farms. 
Studies by Munnell (1974, 1976) and Feldstein (1974, 1982) initiated 
a debate on the effect of social security and private pensions on the 
magnitude of private savings. A number of studies followed these early 
papers, but, to date, this literature has produced no clear picture con- 
cerning the elasticity of private savings with respect to pension savings. 
The data that we have constructed from the SCF will provide a useful 
new source for testing these hypotheses. As of yet, we have not at- 
tempted to estimate savings response to pension coverage and pension 
savings. The data  in table 13.4 indicate that the mean nonpension  wealth 
of persons with pension wealth is not lower than that of persons with 
no such wealth. In fact, nonpension wealth is considerably higher for 
households with pension wealth than for those without pension wealth 
for all ages over fifty-five; however, Z-statistics indicate that nonpen- 
sion wealth for households covered by a pension  is not  statistically 
different for any of the age groups from the wealth of those not covered 
by a pension. 
13.6.2  Pension Wealth and Total Net Wealth: Legal Method 
Estimates of  legal  pension  wealth  using  the two earnings  growth 
assumptions are presented in table 13.5. At all ages, the two estimates 
are very similar. Holding constant the interest rate, it seems reasonable 
to conclude  that legal pension  wealth  is relatively insensitive to the 
earnings growth rate assumption within a fairly wide range of growth 
rates. This is due to two effects.  First, some pension wealth is from 
past jobs or defined  contribution  plans, and therefore our earnings 
assumption, does not  enter into the calculation  of  pension  wealth. 
Second, most plans use relatively few years of earnings to determine 
the salary average in the benefit calculation. Thus, the earnings histories 
based on the different growth assumptions are not very different. 
As expected, legal pension wealth is quite small early in life, rises rap- 
idly during the working  years, and declines with advancing age. For 
workers younger than twenty-five, mean pension wealth is approximately Table 13.5  Wealth Estimates: Legal Method (dollars) 
Net Worth 
Pension Wealth 
Households with  Households with 
Pensions  All Households  Households  Pensions  Percentage of 
without  Households 
Age  CGE  FGE  CGE  FGE  Pensions  CGE  FGE  with Pension 








































































Source: Weighted pension wealth data derived for households in the SCF  and weighted nonpension wealth from the household 
portion of  the SCF. 709  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
$2,000. Wealth triples across each of the next two ten-year age groups, 
to stand at over $60,000 for the cohort aged forty-five to fifty-four. Pen- 
sion wealth then almost doubles  for the next cohort so that wealth is over 
$1 15,000for the cohort  aged fifty-five to sixty-four. After sixty-five, pen- 
sion wealth declines sharply. 
Net worth is the sum of nonpension  and pension  wealth for each 
household, and the mean values are shown in the last five columns of 
table 13.5. The middle of these columns represents net worth for house- 
holds without pensions. For these families, total net worth is identical 
to nonpension wealth. Net worth is also presented for all households 
and for households with some pension wealth. Net worth  for households 
with some pension wealth exceeds the net wealth of the no pension 
households at all ages. Between the ages of fifty-five and seventy-four, 
wealth of the pension households is almost twice that of the nonpension 
households. 
13.6.3  Pension Wealth and Net Worth: Projected Earnings Method 
Pension  wealth  under the projected  earnings  method is shown in 
table  13.6. The CGE pension  wealth is  over $14,000 for households 
with heads younger than age twenty-five using the projected earnings 
method, compared to only $1,900 with the legal  method. Instead of 
tripling across the first two age groups, the projected pension wealth 
only doubles. Slower  growth is also observed across the middle working 
years.  Wealth for the oldest age groups is virtually identical for the 
two methods. This follows from the fact that most of these households 
are currently receiving benefits and are not still working. 
There are greater differences between the CGE and the FGE esti- 
mates under the implicit contracting model than were observed with 
legal pension wealth. This follows from the longer forward projection 
of earnings in the implicit contract model as compared to the relatively 
short backward projections done in conjunction with the legal method. 
These differences vary between 22 and 28 percent for households under 
the age of forty-five but are less than 4  percent for households aged 
fifty-five to sixty-four.  Since most people are retired after the age of 
sixty-five, the wealth estimates for these two assumptions are approx- 
imately equal at these older ages. 
Since pension wealth is higher using the projected earnings method, 
net worth is also higher with this method, compared to the legal method. 
The CGE wealth for all households rises from $10,000 for households 
under the age of twenty-five to approximately $120,000 for those aged 
thirty-five to forty-four. Net worth peaks for households aged fifty-five 
to sixty-four at about $358,000 and then declines for the older house- 
holds. The implicit contract method of evaluating pension wealth results Table 13.6  Wealth Estimates: Projected Earnings Method (dollars) 
Net Worth 
Pension Wealth, 
Households with  Households with 
Pensions  All Households  Households  Pensions 
without 
Age  CGE  FGE  CGE  FGE  Pensions  CGE  FGE 

































































Source: Weighted pension wealth data derived for households in the SCF and weighted nonpension wealth 
from the household portion of  the SCF. 711  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
in much higher net worth for persons with pension wealth at all ages 
compared to households with no pension wealth. 
13.6.4  Pension Wealth as a Percentage of Total Wealth 
The data presented in tables 13.4-13.6  illustrate that pension wealth 
is relatively small early in life and grows until the retirement years. 
This pattern of  wealth accumulation is similar to that for nonpension 
wealth.  Table  13.7  shows the mean value  for pension  wealth  as a 
percentage  of  mean total  wealth by  the age of the household  head. 
The first part of the table shows that, for all households younger than 
twenty-five, legal pension wealth is about 8  percent of total wealth, 
as compared to over 34 percent for the projected  earnings method. 
Legal pension wealth as a percent of total wealth rises with age until 
the fifty-five to sixty-four age group, for which  pension  wealth rep- 
resents 27 percent of total wealth. For the projected earnings method, 
pension wealth varies between 22 and 35 percent of total net worth 
Table 13.7  Pension Wealth as a Percentage of Total Wealth 
All Households 
Legal  Projected 
CGE  FGE  CGE  FGE 






Older than 74 
All households 









































































Source: Weighted pension wealth data derived for households in the SCF and weighted 
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for all ages prior to fifty-five and increases to over 44 percent of total 
net worth for the fifty-five to sixty-four group. 
Looking only  at households with  pensions, pension  wealth  is, of 
course, a larger proportion of total net worth. In these households, the 
fraction of wealth that is due to pension wealth is about 16 percent for 
the youngest  households for the legal method. This ratio rises with 
household age until the fifty-five to sixty-four age group, for which the 
proportion of wealth due to pensions reaches approximately  37 percent. 
The fraction of total net worth due to pension wealth using the projected 
earnings method is more variable. The ratio drops from 59 percent for 
the youngest households to 54 percent for households aged forty-five 
to fifty-four before rising slightly for those aged fifty-five to sixty-four. 
13.6.5  Pension Savings 
These data also permitted us  to calculate pension  savings or the 
change in pension wealth. This was done only for persons who were 
currently working and covered by a defined benefit plan. Pension sav- 
ings was calculated by finding the change in pension wealth from last 
year to this year. These values are reported in table 13.8 for both the 
earnings growth assumptions and both the legal and projected earnings 
methods of evaluating pension wealth. Legal pension savings are very 
low at the youngest ages and rise steeply until retirement. Savings under 
the implicit contract model are larger at all ages, but they increase at 
a slower rate across the age groups. 
In  summary, both of  these methods of calculating pension  wealth 
clearly indicate that pension wealth is an important component of total 
wealth. Ignoring pension wealth substantially understates total wealth 
Table 13.8  Pension Savings among Households Participating in a Defined 
Benefit Plan (dollars) 
L<egal  Projected 
CGE  FGE  CGE  FGE 








































Source: Pension savings data as derived using pension wealth from the pension-provider 
portion of  the SCF. 713  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
and  can lead  to incorrect inferences  concerning the distribution  of 
wealth. This latter point is examined in the next section. 
13.7  Distribution of Wealth 
The preceding  sections have  described the magnitude of  pension 
wealth by age of the head of household.  This analysis indicated that 
pension wealth is a major component of the net worth of households, 
with slightly over half the households having some pension coverage. 
The effect of including pension wealth in an analysis of the distribution 
of household wealth is an unresolved question. Tables 13.9-13.17 pre- 
sent income distribution data for nonpension wealth, pension wealth, 
and net worth. These tables show the wealth value at various percentile 
rankings for each distribution by age of the head of household. For 
example, the zeroth percentile  represents the minimum  value in the 
wealth distribution,  the fiftieth  percentile  is median wealth,  and the 
hundredth percentile is the maximum wealth value. We  present distri- 
butions for both the legal and the projected  earning methods of cal- 
culating pension wealth, using the CGE assumptions. 
Table  13.9 shows the nonpension wealth for all households by age 
groups. These data indicate that the median nonpension wealth in the 
United States in 1983 was $38,300. The values at the various percentiles 
illustrate the same age-wealth pattern as observed for the mean wealth 
values in table 13.4. 
Tables 13.10 and 13.11 show the nonpension wealth distribution for 
households with and without pension coverage. These data, along with 
the mean values shown in table 13.4, indicate that median households 
with  pension  coverage  have  more nonpension wealth  than  median 
households with no pension coverage. Median nonpension wealth for 
all households with pension coverage is $51,600 but is only $18,000 for 
households  without  pension  coverage.  The  wealth  distribution  of 
households with pensions is more compact, as indicated by the range 
of the distributions. Households with pensions have higher minimum 
values and lower maximum values of wealth than do  households with- 
out pensions.  On balance, households with  pension  coverage have 
greater nonpension wealth, and this wealth seems to be more equally 
distributed than the wealth of households without pension coverage. 
Tables  13.12 and 13.13 show the distribution of pension wealth for 
households  with  pension  coverage as estimated  using  the CGE  as- 
sumptions. Using the legal method, household pension wealth is zero 
for unvested workers on current jobs and without pension wealth from 
other jobs. Over 10 percent  of all households  and 25 percent  of the 
younger households are in this category. Using the projected earnings 
method, pension wealth is zero only during the first year of employment. Table 13.9  Nonpension Wealth Distribution by  Age: All Households (thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent  25  Percent  50 Percent 
Younger than 25  -  23.2 
25-34  ~  52.0 
35-44  -44.8 
45 -  54  -9.9 
55-64  -  73.4 
65 -  74  -  40.0 
Older than 74  -  2.7 
All households  -73.4 
-3.7 
-2.5 
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Source: Weighted household wealth data from the SCF. Table 13.10  Nonpension Wealth Distribution by Age: Households with Pensions (thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent  25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent  95 Percent  100 Percent 
Younger than 25 
25-34 
35-44 
45 -  54 
55-64 
65-74 
Older than 74 
All households 
-23.2 
-  52.0 
-44.8 
-9.9 
-  6.0 
-3.3 
-2.7 
-  52.0 
-4.3 















































Source: Weighted household wealth data from the SCF. Table 13.11  Nonpension Wealth Distribution by Age: Households without Pensions (thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent  25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent 
Younger than 25 
25 -  34 
35-44 
45 -  54 
55-64 
65 -  74 
Older than 74 
All households 
-11.0 
-  39.9 
-  11.8 
-  7.9 
-73.4 
-40.0 
-  1.7 
-73.4 
-3.7 
~  2.4 





-  .7 









































Source: Weighted household wealth data from the SCF. Table 13.12 
Age  0 Percent  10  Percent  25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent  95 Percent  100 Percent 
Pension Wealth Distribution by Age: Households with Pensions, Legal CGE (thousands of  dollars) 
Younger than 25 





Older than 74 
All households 
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Source: Weighted pension wealth data derived from the pension-provider portion of  the SCF. Table 13.13  Pension Wealth Distribution by  Age: Households with Pensions Projected Earnings CGE 
(thousands of dollars) 
Age 
Younger than 25 
25-34 
35-44 
45 -  54 
55-64 
65-74 
Older than 74 
All households 
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Source: Weighted pension wealth data derived from the pension-provider portion of  the SCE Table 13.14  Net Worth Distribution by Age: All Households, Legal CGE (thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent  25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent  95 Percent  100 Percent 
Younger than 25 










-  7.9 
-  73.4 
-  40.0 
-  1.9 
-  73.4 
-  3.6  -  .6 
-  1.9  .o 
.o  13.2 
2.5  33.7 
5.5  51.7 
8.1  34.6 
.2  8.5 

































Source: Weighted pension and nonpension wealth data derived from the SCF. Table 13.15  Net Worth Distribution by  Age: All Households, Projected Earnings CGE (thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent  25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent  95 Percent  100 Percent 










-  44.6 
-  7.9 
-73.4 
-40.0 
-  1.9 
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Source: Weighted pension and nonpension wealth data derived from the SCF. Table U.16  Net Worth Distribution by Age: Households with Pension, Legal CGE (thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent 
Younger than 25  -  2 1.7 
25-34  -51.3 
35-44  -44.6 
45-54  -  2.2 
55-64  -  .8 
65-74  9.4 
Older than 74  -  1.9 
-  3.6 






25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent 
-  2.2  3.8  19.2 
3.0  18.3  45.6 
25.5  63.5  133.2 
57.3  128.9  343.2 
102.3  234.0  882.6 
79.1  158.3  827.4 

















All households  -51.3  4.0  24.8  84.5  229.5  3,214.0  58,919.8 
Source; Weighted pension and nonpension wealth data derived from the SCF Table 13.17  Net Worth Distribution by Age: Households with Pensions,  Projected Earnings CGE 
(thousands of dollars) 
Age  0 Percent  10 Percent  25 Percent  50 Percent  75 Percent  95 Percent  100 Percent 
































































Source: Weighted pension and nonpension wealth data derived from the SCF. 723  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
Therefore, only a small proportion of households will have no pension 
wealth under this criterion. 
Median legal pension wealth for all households with pension coverage 
is $17,700, and the wealth at the ninety-fifth percentile is $383,200. This 
compares to a median projected earnings pension wealth of  $30,600 
and a value of  $486,200 at the ninety-fifth percentile. These numbers 
indicate that approximately 42 percent of the pension wealth of a house- 
hold at the middle of the wealth distribution is contingent on continued 
employment at the present job. The wealth loss associated with job 
termination is $12,900 out of the $30,600 in pension wealth shown by 
the projected earnings method. 
Tables  13.14 and  13.15 give the distribution of total net worth for 
households using the legal and projected earnings methods of deter- 
mining pension wealth. Adding legal pension wealth to other wealth 
raises the median net worth for all families from $38,300 (table  13.9) 
to $49,800 (table 13.14). Using the projected earnings method, median 
net worth increases to $57,900. Including pension wealth in the analysis 
primarily raises the wealth of households between the twenty-fifth and 
the ninety-fifth percentiles of  the nonpension wealth distribution. For 
the most part, very poor and very rich households have relatively little 
pension wealth. 
Tables 13.16 and 13.17 show the net worth distribution for households 
with pension coverage. These data can be compared to the distribution 
in  table  13.10 to assess the effect of pension wealth  on  the wealth 
distribution of only those households with pension coverage. Median 
wealth for these households is raised from $51,600 ignoring pension 
wealth to $84,500 using the legal method and $99,200 with the projected 
earnings method. The effect of  including pension wealth has similar 
effects on the distribution of wealth by age as described above for all 
households. 
These preceding analyses clearly indicate the importance of pension 
wealth as a component of  net worth. Tables 13.9-13.17  show the in- 
creased wealth at various percentiles of the wealth distribution. These 
numbers seem to indicate that most pension wealth accrues to wealth 
holders between the twenty-fifth and the ninety-fifth percentile. If true, 
the inclusion of  pension wealth in an examination of  the distribution 
of  net worth should decrease the degree of  inequality in the wealth 
distribution. 
Table  13.18 shows this effect by  reporting the proportion of  non- 
pension wealth and net worth that is held by the top 5  percent and 
the top  1  percent of  the wealth distribution. The top 5 percent of  all 
households  own  57.9 percent  of  nonpension  wealth  but  only  52.5 
percent  of  net  worth  when  pensions  are evaluated  using the  legal 
method  and  55.0 percent  of  net  worth using the  projected  earning Table 13.18  Measurement of Wealth Distribution 
Nonpension Wealth  Net Worth: Legal CGE  Net Worth: Projected CGE 
Percentage of  Percentage of Net  Percentage of  Net 
Wealth Held By:  Worth Held By:  Worth Held By: 
Top5  Top  1  Gini  Top 5  Top  1  Gini  Top 5  Top  1  Gini 
Age  Percent  Percent  Coefficient  Percent  Percent  Coefficient  Percent  Percent  Coefficient 
Younger than 25  55.5  25.4 
25 -  34  47.8  22.5 
35-44  41.9  20.3 
45-54  62.2  40.3 
55-64  50.7  27.2 
65 -  74  56.1  35.0 
Older than 74  50.9  35.7 
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Source: Weighted pension and nonpension wealth data derived from the SCF. 725  Estimates of  Pension Wealth 
method.  Similar  declines  in  the  relative  holdings  of  the  wealthiest 
5 percent of households occur for each age group shown in the table. 
Using the legal method, the relative wealth of the top 1 percent drops 
from 35.5 percent of wealth excluding pensions to 3 1.1 percent of net 
worth when pension wealth is included in the analysis.  By  contrast, 
when pension wealth is evaluated using the projected earnings method, 
the inclusion  of pension  wealth actually  increases the proportion of 
total wealth held by the wealthiest  1 percent of households. 
The overall effect of including pensions in the wealth distribution is 
shown in table 13.18 and figures 13.1 and 13.2. The Lorenz curves are 
constructed by plotting the cumulative  wealth holdings of the popu- 
lation. We restrict the values of the curve to be equal to or greater than 
zero. Thus, the Lorenz curve coincides with the axis until cumulative 
positive wealth is greater than the total negative wealth of the poorest 
households. This procedure maintains the traditional restriction on the 
Gini coefficient to range between zero and one. 
The Gini coefficient for nonpension wealth for all households is 0.806. 
Including legal pension wealth lowers this value to 0.777, while the 
Gini coefficient for net  worth including  projected  pension  wealth  is 
0.783. These data confirm that including pension wealth tends to  reduce 
measured inequality in the wealth distribution. This result is shown in 
the graphs of the Lorenz Curves in figures 13.1 and 13.2. In both figures, 
including pension wealth shifts the curve in toward the line of equity. 
Allowing the Lorenz curve to fall below the horizontal axis to reflect 
negative net worth raises the Gini coefficients but does not alter the 
conclusion that pension wealth reduces measured inequality. 
13.8  Conclusions and Comparison to Earlier Studies 
This paper has provided a detailed examination of the value of pen- 
sion benefits.  Two methods of' calculating pension  wealth  were de- 
scribed and shown to bound the true value of  pension wealth.  Each 
method was applied to data from the 1983 SCF to  derive pension wealth 
for the U.S.  population.  For all households  with pension  coverage, 
mean pension wealth under the projected earnings method was $98,291 
and represented 43 percent of total net worth. At the median of the 
distribution,  pensions  represent 31  percent of  net  worth.  Using the 
legal method of calculating pension wealth lowers these values so that 
mean pension wealth represents 26 percent of mean net worth while 
median pension wealth is 21 percent of median net worth. 
There are very few studies against which these findings can be com- 
pared. The results of two such studies are reviewed below. Quinn (1985) 
estimated the combined pension and social security wealth for house- 
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Fig. 13.1  Distribution of wealth: legal method 
this to their total wealth. He assumed no postretirement adjustments 
and estimated pension and social security wealth under interest rate 
assumptions of  2, 5, and 10 percent. The results at the 5 percent as- 
sumption are most comparable to those reported in  this  study.  His 
sample is limited to households whose head is between age sixty-two 
and sixty-seven. The RHS reports the expected pension benefit for 
each person covered by a pension. Quinn's estimate of pension wealth 
is the present value of this benefit starting at the earliest age of eligi- 
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Fig. 13.2  Distribution of  wealth: projected earnings 
creased by 124 percent (the change in the consumer price index (CPI) 
and the return on three-month Treasury bills) to  make them comparable 
to our 1983 data. 
Quinn found that median wealth without social security and pensions 
in 1973 was $61,869 for married men, $21,056 for nonmarried men, and 
$12,790 for nonmarried women. At the 5 percent interest rate assump- 
tion, median wealth with social security and pensions was $238,762 for 
married men, $141,277 for nonmarried men, and $76,653 for nonmarried 
women. The proportion of this wealth in pension rights was roughly 728  A. A. McDermediR.  L. ClarWS. G.  Allen 
12.9 percent for married men, 11.9 percent for nonmarried men, and 
13.4 percent for nonmarried women (calculated from midpoints of the 
intervals  in  table  3  of  Quinn  1985). Thus, pension  wealth  averaged 
$30,800 for married men, $16,811 for nonmarried men, and $10,286 for 
nonmarried women. 
Mean nonpension  wealth is considerably larger for the most com- 
parable group in the SCF-$196,492  for the fifty-five to sixty-four age 
group. Pension wealth is also much larger using our derived values of 
wealth.  Under the legal (CGE) method, mean pension wealth across 
all households  aged fifty-five to sixty-four is $73,922; under the pro- 
jected (CGE) earnings method, it is $161,468. These values are derived 
by multiplying mean pension wealth shown in tables 13.5 and 13.6 by 
the proportion of persons covered by a pension. Both estimates are 
much larger than  Quinn’s estimate for married  men.  This could  be 
attributable  to growth in pension coverage or more generous benefit 
formulas. Another possibility is that survey respondents systematically 
underestimate their benefits. 
We  have not yet examined the data on expected benefits  provided 
by the SCF respondents. Avery,  Elliehausen,  and Gustafson (1985) 
report a mean value of pension wealth (including thrift assets) of $43,511 
for households  with married heads fifty and over and of $27,985 for 
those with unmarried heads. In all but 8 percent of the households, the 
age of the head is sixty-five or lower, so the most comparable estimate 
in our results is once again for the fifty-five to sixty-four age group. 
Even under the legal method, our estimates are much higher than those 
obtained  by  Avery,  Elliehausen,  and Gustafson from the household 
responses, suggesting the possibility of significant underreporting. 
Cartwright  and Friedland  (1985) used pension benefit data from a 
survey done for the President’s Commission on Pension Policy in Sep- 
tember 1979. Their estimates are largely based on individual responses 
to the questionnaire. When this information was not available, they 
imputed benefits from either the Department of Labor’s EBS-1 forms 
or the employer survey. Private pensions were discounted at a rate of 
7 percent (3 percent real, 4 percent inflation) and public pensions at a 
rate of  3  percent (all real).  Individual retirement  accounts, Keoghs, 
and annuities are included in the estimates. For nonvested workers, 
the probability  of  vesting was imputed  from a  cross-sectional  logit 
equation. Their estimates are increased by 37.2 percent below to reflect 
the change in the CPI between 1979 and 1983. 
The average household in the Pension Commission Survey had $4,503 
of retirement assets, representing 6 percent of net worth. In contrast, 
our estimates of pension wealth for the average household under the 
CGE assumptions are $26,052 under the legal method and $53,863 under 
the projected  earnings method. Mean retirement wealth (table 13.19) 729  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
Table 13.19  Retirement Wealth: Pension Commission Survey 
Mean Retirement Wealth ($)  Ratio of 
Households  Households  Assets to 
Ratio of  Retirement 
with  with  Net Wealth 
Age  Households  Wealth  Wealth  Households 
All  Retirement  Retirement  All 
Under 25  1,547  7,032  .22  .04 
35-44  3,906  9,766  .40  .04 
45-54  9,922  21,112  .47  .08 
55-64  14,175  28,929  .49  .I2 
65 and over  1,858  30,975  .06  .02 
Source: Cartwright and Friedland (1985). 
varied  by  age group in a pattern that  was very comparable to that 
observed in tables 13.5 and 13.6. To  compare mean retirement wealth 
to those  for  households  with  pensions  in  tables  13.5 and  13.6, we 
divided the mean retirement wealth for all households by the ratio of 
households with retirement wealth. The corresponding estimates for 
households with retirement wealth are shown in the second column of 
table  13.19. Except for the under thirty-five group, the estimates in 
table 13.19 are much smaller than our estimates in tables 13.5 and 13.6. 
The gap between these two sets is largest (in relative terms) for the 
fifty-five to sixty-four age group. Shown in the last column of  table 
13.19 are ratios of  retirement assets to net wealth estimated for each 
age group using table A8 in Cartwright and Friedland (1985). Again the 
ratios in  table  13.19 are much lower for every  age group than  the 
corresponding estimates in table 13.7. 
In conclusion, several key findings of this study should be indicated. 
1. Pension wealth is a large and important component of household 
wealth. Pension wealth follows the expected life-cycle pattern of  in- 
creasing with age up until retirement and then declines. 
2. Our results are larger than those reported by Quinn (1985) or by 
Cartwright and Friedland (1985), both in terms of the absolute mag- 
nitude of pension wealth and the ratio of pension wealth to net worth. 
3. Nonpension wealth of older households with pension coverage is 
considerably larger than the wealth of older households without pension 
coverage. 
4. Pension wealth reduces measured inequality in the distribution of 
wealth . 
5. A key omission of this study is social security wealth. Calculating 
social security wealth for these households is a research priority. In- 
cluding social security wealth should further reduce wealth inequality. 
The distribution of social security wealth is an interesting issue in itself. 730  A. A. McDermed/R. L. ClarWS. G. Allen 
6. The inclusion of  pension wealth into a measure of net worth will 
bring the life-cycle pattern of net worth more into conformity with the 
predictions of the life-cycle savings hypothesis. First, during the work- 
ing years, the inclusion of pension wealth results in a more rapid rise 
in net worth between ages thirty-five  and sixty-five.  Second, during 
the retirement  years, the inclusion of pension  wealth will accelerate 
the decline in net worth. Consider the example of a household with 
$200,000 of  nonpension  wealth, along with a pension  of  $1,000 per 
month for the head, whose is age sixty-five. The wealth value of  the 
pension is $101,370 at sixty-five but declines to $38,980 at eighty solely 
owing to the decline  in  life expectancy. Even if  nonpension  wealth 
remains constant, the decline in pension wealth lowers net worth from 
$301,310 to $238,986, or a decline of 21 percent in fifteen years. 
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Comment  Cordelia W.  Reimers 
McDermed,  Clark, and Allen’s goal in  this paper  is to add private 
pension wealth (but, it should be noted, not social security wealth) to 
household net worth and to show how this affects the distribution of 
net worth by age of the household head. It has been notoriously difficult 
to get good estimates of private pension wealth for individuals of all 
ages from household surveys because people usually do not know their 
pension benefits unless they are near retirement. (Indeed, one of the 
best predictors of propensity to retire in  the next two-year period is 
ability to answer a question about the size of pension benefits.) These 
authors exploit  a better  source of  information:  the  1983 Survey of 
Consumer Finance (SCF). This survey asked pension  providers for 
plan characteristics, enabling the authors to calculate expected pension 
benefits, and pension wealth, after making a number of assumptions. 
My comments will discuss, first, these basic decisions the authors 
had to make; next, what is in the paper and some of their findings; 
and, finally, what is controversial about it. Some assumptions are nec- 
essary in order to estimate a person’s expected future pension benefit 
stream and to convert this into an amount of pension wealth accrued 
to date. 
For defined contribution plans (10 percent of those with pensions in 
the SCF sample), current pension wealth is simply the current value 
of the person’s pension account. There is no need to calculate benefits 
or discount  them.  But, for defined benefit plans,  the authors must 
estimate the expected benefits accrued so far, convert them to a life 
annuity beginning at retirement age, and discount the purchase back 
Cordelia W.  Reirners is professor of economics at  Hunter College and the Graduate 
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to the current year, allowing for mortality risk. (However, they do not 
discount for the risks of job termination, plan termination, or inflation 
after retirement .) 
The problem of estimating the expected benefit accrued to date is a 
thorny one. Two key issues are highlighted in the paper. First, is the 
labor contract a one-period, renewable one or an implicit lifetime con- 
tract to age sixty-five? Second, how do earnings grow over time? 
If the contract is for only one period at a time, the expected benefit 
is just what has actually accrued to date-what  the employer is obli- 
gated  to pay  if  the worker is terminated today.  Under this  “legal” 
method of calculating benefits, the benefit increases with each year on 
a job because of increasing years of service and higher earnings. If the 
contract is long term, on the other hand, the expected benefit is what 
the worker would get if he or she stayed with the firm until retirement. 
Since this typically depends on the earnings in the last few years before 
retirement, it is called the “projected earnings” method. There is still 
the question of  how much of  this ultimate total benefit accrues each 
year. The authors assume that pension wealth increases each year only 
because there is an additional year of service in the formula since there 
is no change in the final earnings figure used in  the calculation. This 
in effect assumes that rights to the ultimate total benefit are acquired 
at a constant rate over the life of the contract. While arguing that the 
evidence about the relation of quits and earnings behavior to pension 
coverage and vesting favors the projected earnings method, the authors 
show results using both it and the legal method. 
The second  key  issue is  what  growth rate of  earnings  to  use  in 
calculating either the past earnings history (for the legal method) or 
future earnings (for the projected earnings method). Again, McDermed, 
Clark, and Allen show results under two assumptions: a constant earn- 
ings growth rate (CGE) of 5.5 percent per year, due to economy-wide 
real wage growth  of  1.5 percent  and  inflation of  4  percent, and the 
Federal Reserve Board’s computed age-race-sex-industry-occupation- 
specific growth rates that are included in  the SCF data tape (FGE). 
These FGE growth rates average 5.5 percent overall but decline with 
age. The CGE  assumption implies a linear age-log earnings  profile, 
while the FGE assumption conforms better to the observed concavity 
of  age-log earnings profiles. 
The FGE assumption about earnings growth yields lower pension 
wealth estimates than does the CGE assumption, under both assump- 
tions about the nature of  the labor contract. On the one hand, FGE 
assumes earnings have grown faster than 5.5 percent up to the current 
age. This yields lower average past earnings when benefits are calcu- 
lated by the legal method. On the other hand, under the FGE assump- 
tion, earnings grow more slowly than 5.5 percent at later ages. This 733  Estimates of  Pension Wealth 
results in lower final earnings when benefits are calculated by the pro- 
jected earnings method. 
In the paper, McDermed, Clark, and Allen first present simulations 
of  life-cycle accumulation of  pension wealth for a hypothetical  indi- 
vidual under a one-period versus a long-term labor contract, assuming 
a constant  5.5  percent  rate  of  growth of  total  compensation  (i.e., 
earnings plus pension compensation). They then use the 1983 SCF to 
estimate actual pension wealth and total wealth of  a cross section of 
households  under the four combinations  of  assumptions: one-period 
versus  long-term  labor  contract  (i.e.,  legal  vs.  projected  earnings 
method) and linear versus concave age-log earnings profile (i.e., CGE 
vs. FGE). Despite the effort to collect information from pension pro- 
viders, 44 percent of  the people  with defined benefit plans on their 
current job had missing data on the plan’s characteristics. The authors 
therefore estimated pension benefit regressions to impute the missing 
information, again using the four alternative assumptions about the 
labor contract and earnings growth rate. 
These regressions may be one of the most useful parts of the paper 
to other researchers who need to impute pension benefits. Given data 
on age, job tenure,  salary, industry,  occupation, and plan type, one 
can use these regression equations to predict a person’s pension benefit. 
(I only wish race and gender had been included, too.) These equations 
should be more accurate than those one can estimate from the National 
Longitudinal Survey (NLS) or the Retirement History Survey (RHS) 
because they are based on provider information about the plan rather 
than on the worker’s guess and because the sample used to estimate 
the equations is not biased toward people who are about to retire. 
Having estimated pension and total wealth, the authors show the 
cross-sectional distributions, by  age of the household  head, of  non- 
pension wealth, pension  wealth, total net  worth, pensionhet worth 
ratio, and annual pension  savings, for households with and without 
pensions and for all households under all four assumptions. Comparison 
of these tables reveals the effect of including pension wealth on the 
wealth distribution. First, wealth is increased, of course, but primarily 
between  the  twenty-fifth  and  the  ninety-fifth  percentiles.  Second, 
households with pensions have higher nonpension  wealth than those 
without pensions. This would suggest that pensions increase inequality. 
But, third, including pension wealth reduces the Gini coefficient, which 
suggests just the opposite-that  pensions reduce inequality. This ap- 
parent contradiction highlights an issue to which I return below: the 
inherent limitations of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients in this type 
of analysis. 
Fourth, as other researchers  have found, the cross-cohort  wealth 
distribution has a peak at age fifty-five to sixty-four. We  should not too 734  A. A. McDermediR. L. ClarMS. G. Allen 
easily conclude from this that the distribution of wealth over an indi- 
vidual’s life cycle has a similar shape without  knowing the effect of 
the shift in gender of household heads as age rises in the cross section 
owing to differential mortality of men and women. Perhaps the lower 
wealth  of households with  heads over age sixty-five reflects  the in- 
creasing number of female heads and women’s relative poverty rather 
than dissaving by the elderly. 
The paper concludes with a comparison of these results with a few 
other studies of the distribution of pension wealth. McDermed, Clark, 
and Allen find much higher estimates of nonpension and pension wealth 
in the SCF  than are reported in other studies that used the NLS or the 
RHS. The SCF is more thorough in asking about all types of assets, 
including life insurance and consumer durables, and includes provider 
information about pension  plans.  Apparently,  people  tend to under- 
estimate their benefits when answering survey questions. 
This paper is carefully done, uses better data than has hitherto been 
available, and gives a clear picture of the consequences of including 
private  pensions  in  the distribution  of  household  wealth, given  the 
assumptions adopted by  the authors. However, the paper is contro- 
versial in certain respects. I shall focus on three: the failure to discount 
adequately for risk, the assumed time path of pension accrual under 
an implicit  lifetime labor contract, and the misleading use of Lorenz 
curves and Gini coefficients. 
The first controversy involves a basic conceptual issue: how to assign 
a present value to a stream of future income that cannot be alienated 
from the recipient.  We  want to count pensions in  household  wealth 
because they presumably affect savings behavior and labor supply be- 
havior and because they are an aspect of inequality of access to goods 
and services. But pensions are different from conventional assets and 
so may not have the same effects on either behavior or inequality.  If 
all goes well and the person actually receives the anticipated real ben- 
efits, of course the pension is as good as a bond or a rental property. 
But all may not go well. In particular, their illiquidity and the types of 
risk  to which  they  are subject  mean  that pensions are a much  less 
valuable form of wealth than marketable assets yielding the same future 
income stream. Perhaps the right way to evaluate pension wealth is to 
imagine that a person could sell his or her pension rights and to ask 
what the market value would be. Does the fact that this would be a 
very low number-that  in fact no such market has developed-suggest 
something about the discount factor for risk? 
This  line of reasoning  concludes that pension  wealth  is  seriously 
overestimated in this paper, even using the legal method and the FGE 
earnings growth rates. As the authors recognize, their pension wealth 
figures calculated by the projected  earnings method are upper-bound 735  Estimates of Pension Wealth 
estimates because they discount only for mortality  risk, not for the 
risks of job termination, plan termination, and unanticipated inflation 
after retirement. However, they consider the legal method estimates 
to be a lower bound. Surely, these too should be discounted for the 
risks of employer bankruptcy, plan termination, and inflation. The fact 
that pension rights are not marketable and that one cannot even borrow 
against them much before retirement suggests that the risk discount 
factor is quite large. 
One could quibble with many of the other assumptions that the au- 
thors had to make, such as immediate vesting, no survivors’ benefits, 
no early retirement benefits, no postretirement changes in benefits, a 
nominal interest rate of 6 percent, and an inflation rate of 4 percent. 
But this would hardly be fair since one inevitably must assume some- 
thing about these matters and since these assumptions are as sensible 
as any. Some speculation about the way these assumptions affect the 
results would have been useful.  But these are minor issues compared 
with the lack of discounting for risk. 
The authors’ implicit  assumption about the accumulation  path  of 
pension wealth under the projected earnings method is also question- 
able. Under a lifetime labor contract, the expected pension will depend 
on final earnings and total years of service at retirement. If we take 
seriously the assumption of a lifetime labor contract, this final pension 
wealth fund could be built up from zero over the duration of the job 
by a variety of time patterns of accumulation, bounded from below by 
the time path of pension wealth as calculated by the legal method. The 
choice of any particular path is essentially arbitrary, yet the estimated 
age profile of pension wealth depends critically on this choice. In this 
paper, it is assumed without discussion that pension wealth grows in 
a straight line. But there could be other assumptions, which would alter 
the age distribution  of pension  wealth  under the projected  earnings 
method. 
Next, there are the seemingly contradictory findings about the effect 
of  pensions  on the distribution  of  wealth.  Apparently,  pensions  in- 
crease inequality, at least in the lower part of the distribution,  since 
those households  with low nonpension  wealth do not  have pensions 
either. But this is missed by the Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients, 
which  show pension wealth reducing inequality. The problem is that 
many households have negative wealth; the lower tail of the wealth 
distribution is made up of these net debtors. Because Lorenz curves 
and  Gini  coefficients  are completely  insensitive  to changes in  the 
distribution  of  negative wealth, they  cannot properly  summarize  or 
compare distributions  that include net debtors. They could  be used 
to depict the distribution of wealth  among the subset of households 
that have nonnegative wealth, but, since including pensions changes 736  A. A. McDermed/R.  L. Clark/% G. Allen 
the composition of  this subset, Gini coefficients cannot fully capture 
the  effect of  pensions  on this distribution  either.  In any case, their 
use in this paper is misleading; we should not accept the conclusion 
that private pensions reduce the inequality of wealth. 
Finally,  I  wish  the authors had  explored the gender difference  in 
pension wealth and had shown the distributions by gender as well as 
age of  household head. As noted above, this might shed some light on 
the peak at age fifty-five to sixty-four as well as on gender differences 
in wealth.  1 hope a future paper as careful, clear, and thorough as this 
one will investigate the effects of  gender, too. 